

Message Text

SECRET

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SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 25, 1974

(SALT TWO - 480)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR
JOHNSON AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF OCTOBER 25, 1974.

QUOTE

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

OCTOBER 25, 1974

MR. MINISTER:

I

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HAVING IN MIND QUESTIONS THAT HAVE ARISEN, I WANT TODAY TO

ADDRESS AGAIN WHAT THE UNITED STATES REGARDS AS A BASIC CONCEPT FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS, NAMELY, THE NEED IN A NEW AGREEMENT FOR A HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE IN THE ICBM'S, SLBM'S, AND HEAVY BOMBERS POSSESSED BY OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION THAT THE POTENTIAL DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ON BOTH SIDES IS CONCENTRATED IN THESE THREE SYSTEMS. ACCORDINGLY, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR TWO DELEGATIONS SHOULD CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS ON WORKING OUT LIMITATIONS ON THESE THREE SYSTEMS, WHICH CONSTITUTE THE CORE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

II

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS UNTIL 1985 MUST PROVIDE FOR A HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE IN THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF BOTH SIDES, THAT IS, THE ICBM'S, SLBM'S, AND HEAVY BOMBERS. THIS HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE SHOULD ENDURE THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD OF THE AGREEMENT.

WE VIEW A HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE AS MEANING THAT THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY OF THE THREE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF THE TWO SIDES SHOULD BE IN BALANCE, BOTH IN FACT AND IN APPEARANCE. THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH A BALANCE MEANS THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO OBTAIN A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THEREFORE, SUCH A BALANCE WOULD CONFORM TO A BASIC PRINCIPLE GOVERNING OUR NEGOTIATIONS AS AGREED BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL.

IN OUR VIEW, A HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE IN ICBM'S, SLBM'S, AND HEAVY BOMBERS INVOLVES BOTH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE ASPECTS. WITH REGARDS TO QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE GOAL FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD BE TO ACHIEVE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE COMMON LOWER LEVEL IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS. EQUALITY IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF THESE SYSTEMS WOULD SERVE TO CURB THE ARMS COMPETITION IN AN EQUITABLE MANNER.

ACHIEVEMENT THROUGH MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF AN EQUAL AGGREGATE
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FOR BOTH SIDES IN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS WOULD MARK A POSITIVE STEP TOWARD THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. HOWEVER, THE HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE WHICH WE SEEK REQUIRES MORE THAN NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY TO CONSTRAIN THE DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITY OF THESE ARMS BY ESTABLISHING AT THE SAME TIME EFFECTIVE AND EQUITABLE LIMITATIONS OF THEIR QUALITATIVE ASPECTS.

FOR THIS REASON, THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE HAVE SET FORTH TWO CONCEPTS. FIRST WE BELIEVE THE NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR LIMITATION ON THE THROW-WEIGHT OF MISSILES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PAYLOAD OF HEAVY BOMBERS. SECONDLY, WE BELIEVE THE NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD LIMIT THE NUMBER OF MIRV'ED MISSILE LAUNCHERS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE THROW-WEIGHT AND NUMBER OF REENTRY VEHICLES OF PERMITTED MIRV SYSTEMS.

WE RECOGNIZE THE COMPLEXITIES OF WORKING OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE DIFFERENT. LITTLE PRECEDENT EXISTS TO GUIDE US IN DEVELOPING QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS. ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL IN CERTAIN CASES REQUIRE SPECIAL MEASURES. NEVERTHELESS, WE BELIEVE THAT WE MUST DEVISE LIMITATIONS ON THE QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IF WE ARE TO SLOW DOWN THE ARMS COMPETITION AND REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR.

IN SETTING FORTH OUR CONCEPTS ON QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS, WE HAVE NOT SPECIFIED ANY LEVELS. WE BELIEVE THESE LEVELS WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS. IN VIEW OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SUBJECT MATTER, THEIR DETERMINATION WILL REQUIRE CAREFUL ANALYSIS BY OUR TWO DELEGATIONS.

IN CARRYING OUT THIS WORK, WE WILL NEED TO BE GUIDED BY A GENERAL CONCEPT. IT IS FOR THAT REASON WE HAVE PROPOSED THE CONCEPT OF A HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE IN ICBM'S, SLBM'S, AND HEAVY BOMBERS OF THE TWO SIDES. IN OUR VIEW, QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS -- A LOWER EQUAL LEVEL IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBERS OF ICBM LAUNCHERS, SLBM LAUNCHERS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS -- COMBINED WITH QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS -- LIMITATION ON THROW-WEIGHT, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PAYLOAD OF HEAVY BOMBERS, AND LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF

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MIRV'ED MISSILE LAUNCHERS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE THROW-WEIGHT AND NUMBER OF REENTRY VEHICLES OF PERMITTED MIRV'ED SYSTEMS -- SHOULD PROVIDE A HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE IN THE THREE MAJOR SYSTEMS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THIS HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE WOULD MEAN A BALANCE IN THE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL POSSESSED BY THE TWO SIDES OVER THE PERIOD OF THE NEW AGREEMENT. SUCH A BALANCE WOULD CONSTITUTE AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING THE FURTHER REFLECTIONS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION WITH REGARD TO THESE CONCEPTS THAT I HAVE ADVANCED.

UNQUOTE

JOHNSON

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NNN

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